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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Benjamin Edwards’ Conflicts & Capital Allocation is a timely
piece that examines the far-reaching consequences of commission-based
compensation for financial advisors.1 In the article, Professor Edwards
convincingly demonstrates that commission-based compensation creates
structural conflicts of interest for financial advisors who sell their clients
financial products that generate higher commissions for the advisor but do not
maximize the client’s wealth.2 But, as Professor Edwards argues, the effect of
financial advisors’ compensation-related conflicts extends beyond retail
investment clients and into the financial markets, causing systemic capital
misallocation. The potential macro-level harm that arises from conflicted
investment advice thus requires an effective response. To this end, Professor
Edwards puts forward a straightforward, bright-line proposal: a prohibition on
commission-based compensation for financial advisors.3 As Professor
Edwards asserts: “[b]anning commission compensation for personalized
* Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. J.D. Cornell Law
School. B.A. Mount Holyoke College. For helpful research assistance, I’d like to thank
Lucrecia Guerra Galdamez, Emily Guillaume, Zoe Gyampoh, and the editors of Ohio State
Law Journal Furthermore. All errors and omissions are my own.
1 Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181 (2017).
In this Response, the term “financial advisor” refers to investment advisers and brokerdealers, collectively. The difference between the two is delineated in greater detail infra.
2 See id. at 184 (“Some products offer the advisors larger commissions, and advisors
have an incentive to steer clients toward products that maximize advisor commissions.”).
3 See id. at 185, 209.
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financial advice will better align financial advisor incentives with their clients’
interest and improve capital allocation.”4 He further opines that a complete
prohibition on commissions is the most efficient way to minimize and avoid
the harms that accompany a commission-based compensation structure.5
Compensation-related conflicts of interest are common in the financial
markets beyond financial advisors and retail investors.6 Credit rating agencies,
for example, are paid by the issuers whose debt they are rating, which may
incentivize them to inflate ratings in order to attract more ratings
opportunities.7 Similarly, directors set their own compensation for serving on a
corporation’s board, which allows them to potentially maximize their earnings
at the expense of the corporation and its shareholders.8 Indeed, one need look
no further than the ongoing scandal that currently embroils Wells Fargo
regarding fraudulent accounts that the bank’s employees created in order to
meet their quotas.9 In each example, the compensation structure is innately
conflicted, has been viewed as a primary impetus for related scandals, and has
resulted in many of the ills identified in Conflicts and Capital Allocation.10
4 Id. at 209.
5 See id. at 209, 212.
6 See Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies

in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 246–49 (2009)
(describing the conflict of interest inherent in the credit agencies). See generally Susan
E.K. Christoffersen et al., What Do Consumers’ Fund Flows Maximize? Evidence from
Their Brokers’ Incentives, 68 J. FIN. 201 (2013) (demonstrating that brokers’ compensation
increases when brokers are affiliated with family funds and consequently involved in
investment recommendations).
7 See Lynch, supra note 6, at 247 (“[U]nder the issuer-pays revenue model, the
interests of issuers and the interests of the credit rating agencies necessarily coalesce, and
the credit rating agencies can make more money by providing their paying customers—
issuers—with higher ratings.”).
8 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in
the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 763 (2002) (“The second
agency problem in most public companies is that executives might make decisions that
maximize their own utility but that fail to maximize shareholder value.”).
9 See Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening
Accounts,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
8,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-years-ofharm-to-customers.html [https://perma.cc/K5TE-65CC] (“Regulators said the bank’s
employees had been motivated to open the unauthorized accounts by compensation policies
that rewarded them for opening new accounts . . . .”).
10 See Robert J. Rhee, On Duopoly and Compensation Games in the Credit Rating
Industry, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 85, 86–87, 89, 94 (2013) (stating that the issuer-pay
compensation model led credit rating agencies to play a significant role in the 2008
financial crisis); Allana M. Grinshteyn, Horseshoes and Hand Grenades: The Dodd-Frank
Act’s (Almost) Attack on Credit Rating Agencies, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 937, 978 (2011)
(“[T]he Financial Crisis Inquiry Commissio[n] . . . conclu[ded] that the credit rating
agencies were among the main actors to blame for the economic crisis . . . .”); Janice Kay
McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign
Management and Shareholders’ Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity,
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However, despite the innate and unavoidable issues that accompany
commission-based compensation, the structure seems to be here with us to
stay, at least in the short- to medium-term.11 Thus, in this Response, I consider
recent efforts to implement one of the alternatives to commission-based
compensation that Professor Edwards raises—namely, the imposition of
fiduciary duties or a fiduciary-like standard on financial advisors.
Fiduciary obligations developed as part of the law of equity, specifically in
instances in which a person was expected to act as a “trustee” because of her
relationship of trust and confidence with another.12 A fiduciary is one who is
granted authority to manage the affairs of the principal and, therefore, is
entrusted to further the principal’s best interest in her actions and decisions.13
Thus, integral to fiduciary obligations is the expectation that the fiduciary act:
(i) loyally by eschewing or disclosing conflicts of interest; (ii) with care by
acting deliberatively in decision-making; and (iii) with candor by disclosing all
material and relevant information to the principal.14 Recently, there has been
legislative and regulatory interest in harmonizing the standards of conduct
applicable to all financial advisors, bringing them closer to a fiduciary(-like)
standard.15 The first salvo in the battle to impose fiduciary obligations on
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 974–75 (2004) (describing the compensation structure
adopted by Enron’s board of directors, which led to Enron’s bankruptcy); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Shareholder Activism in the Era of Trump: What Strategy Works?, CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG (Nov. 21, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/11/21/shareholderactivism-in-the-era-of-trump-what-strategy-works/ [https://perma.cc/9P76-9454] (“A final
example this year of incentive compensation producing ethically dubious risk-taking and
fraudulent behavior is supplied by Wells Fargo & Co. . . . Under pressure, lower echelon
employees opted to cheat to avoid losing their jobs.”).
11 See Coffee, supra note 10 (“Clearly, incentive compensation is here to stay . . . .”).
12 See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 880–81 (1988) (describing the historical development of fiduciary
law and obligations).
13 See id. at 882.
14 See id. at 882, 899, 906; see also James S. Wrona, The Best of Both Worlds: A
Fact-Based Analysis of the Legal Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers
and a Framework for Enhanced Investor Protection, 68 BUS. LAW. 1, 11–13 (2012).
15 See 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-11(g)(1) (2012) (authorizing the Securities Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) to promulgate rules providing that the standard of conduct for all
brokers, dealers, and investment advisers be to “act in the best interest of the customer
without regard to the financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, or investment adviser
providing the advice”); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(g)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828–29 (2010) (establishing the
standards of conduct for investment advisers); Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict
of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550). The imposition of a fiduciary standard would
change the regulatory landscape for broker-dealers, who currently operate under a
suitability standard. Registered financial advisors, on the other hand, are already subject to
a fiduciary standard. See General Information on the Regulation of Investment Advisers,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N
(Mar.
11,
2011),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iaregulation/memoia.htm
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financial advisors came from the Department of Labor (“DOL”), which
implemented the “Fiduciary Rule” pursuant to its authority under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).16 And, after the
Fiduciary Rule failed to come to fruition,17 the Securities Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) proposed Regulation Best Interest to impose a best
interest standard on broker-dealers.18 Both are efforts aimed at reducing the
problem of conflicted advice, enhancing investor protection, and minimizing
investor confusion. Yet, as this Response demonstrates, the problem of
conflicted investment advice is intractable and persists despite these regulatory
proposals.
This Response focuses on these recent efforts to “fiduciarize” or otherwise
heighten the standard of conduct applicable to financial advisors and analyzes
whether and to what extent the proposed fiduciary(-like) standards minimize
the conflicted advice problem. As regulators and industry actors attempt to
tackle the innate conflicts of interest that arise in the investor-financial advisor
relationship through the imposition of fiduciary(-like) duties, it is necessary to
analyze the potential implications of these proposals.
This brief Response first analyzes the applicable legal framework that
governs the conduct of financial advisors in providing investment advice to
retail customers. The Response highlights the muddled and uneven state of
affairs with respect to different types of financial advisors to demonstrate the
confusion that retail investors face. Next, it discusses the short-lived and nowdefunct DOL Fiduciary Rule and the SEC’s recently proposed rule, Regulation
Best Interest. Before concluding, this Response analyzes the implications, both
positive and negative, of these proposals for retail investors.

II. THE LAW GOVERNING INVESTMENT ADVICE
Retail investors may rely on brokers and/or investment advisers19 to help
them decide how to allocate their investments.20 To the typical retail investor,
[https://perma.cc/QCN8-SDBW] (“[I]nvestment advisers owe their clients a duty to
provide only suitable investment advice.”).
16 See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20,946 (“With this regulatory action, the Department will replace
the 1975 regulations with a definition of fiduciary investment advice that better reflects the
broad
scope
of
the
statutory
text
and
its
purposes
and
better
protects . . . beneficiaries . . . from conflicts of interest, imprudence, and disloyalty.”).
17 See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
18 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,675 (May 9, 2018) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (new rule establishing standard of conduct for brokerdealers).
19 Investment advisers is also spelled “advisors.” This Response opts for the former
spelling when referring to investment advisers (i.e., those covered under the Investment
Adviser Act of 1940). However, when referring collectively to financial services
professionals who work with and provide advice to retail investors, this Response uses
“advisors”—e.g., “financial advisors” and “retirement investment advisors.”
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there is little-to-no difference between a broker and an investment adviser.21
Yet, the law makes a stark distinction between the two, particularly with
respect to investor protection.22 Key to understanding why the law treats the
two seemingly similar positions so differently lies in understanding how
brokers and investment advisers have historically interacted with retail
customers. Traditionally, brokers have been considered salespeople and,
consequently, they are required only to sell “suitable” financial products to
their clients. Investment advisers, on the other hand, provide holistic
investment advice to clients and, as a result, investment advisers are
considered fiduciaries of their clients. The legal distinction between brokers
and investment advisers is considered in greater detail below.

A. Brokers & Suitability
A simple, yet incomplete, description of brokers is that they are
salespeople.23 A broker is an intermediary between (i) financial firms that
create financial products and (ii) retail investors who may want to invest in
these products.24 Brokers are regulated under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (“the 34 Act”), which subjects them to SEC oversight (indirectly)25 and
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) regulatory
requirements (directly).26 FINRA regulates brokers’ compensation, training,
qualification and, importantly, their responsibilities to and interactions with
retail investors.27 Per FINRA Rule 2010, brokers “in the conduct of [their]
20 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-

DEALERS i (Jan. 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z5DJ-Q3RN] (“Retail investors seek guidance from broker-dealers and
investment advisers to manage their investments and to meet their . . . financial goals.”).
21 See ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND CORP., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY
PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS xiii (2008),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/K74PQFDJ] (finding that retail investors do not differentiate well between advisory accounts
and brokerage accounts and have similar expectations for both).
22 See id. at 14–15, 115.
23 See Anita K. Krug, The Other Securities Regulator: A Case Study in Regulatory
Damage, 92 TUL. L. REV. 339, 357 (2017) (“[A] broker’s purpose is not to provide
investment advice but, rather, to sell securities. Simply put, brokers are salespersons.”).
24 See HUNG ET AL., supra note 21, at xiii, 19.
25 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS BY THE
U.S.
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
5
(Mar.
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9LPN-EYSY].
26 FINRA is a self-regulatory organization (SRO) charged with overseeing the
financial markets and enforcing rules that govern the conduct of financial market
participants. FINRA is a not-for-profit organization that is not a government agency, but is
subject to the regulatory authority of the SEC. See About FINRA, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY
AUTH., http://www.finra.org/about [https://perma.cc/E95N-2V46].
27 See id.
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business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor.”28 FINRA’s
standards of conduct require that brokers ascertain the “suitability” of a
security before it is sold to a retail investor.29 Per the suitability standard,
brokers must “know their customer” and “know the security” (i.e., that the
broker have a reasonable basis on which to believe that the security is
appropriate for the customer at the time of sale).30 Thus, brokers are prohibited
from selling or promoting securities that are contrary to the investors’
preferences.31 The suitability standard is intended to address the inherent
conflicts of interest that brokers face as intermediaries between the markets
and retail investors and also recognize the sales focus of brokers in their client
interactions.32

B. Investment Advisers & Fiduciary Duties
Traditionally, to the extent brokers provide investment advice to
customers, such advice is secondary to the brokers’ sales focus.33 On the other
hand, the primary responsibility of investment advisers is to provide
investment advice to clients.34 Investment advisers are not intermediaries
between the markets and investors; rather, they provide financial advice to
clients and are prohibited from entering into securities transactions with
28 FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA MANUAL Rule 2010 (2008),
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=5504
[https://perma.cc/AK62-633C].
29 See Gary A. Varnavides, The Flawed State of Broker-Dealer Regulation and the
Case for an Authentic Federal Fiduciary Standard for Broker-Dealers, 16 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 210 (2011) (explaining the difference between the standard imposed
on brokers under FINRA and the fiduciary obligations).
30 See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 11-02: KNOW YOUR
CUSTOMER
AND
SUITABILITY
2
(Oct.
7,
2011),
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p122778.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L98T-CKEE].
31 See Wrona, supra note 14, at 11, 20 (discussing FINRA’s suitability rule which
obliges brokers to recommend strategies and transactions to their clients based on their
needs and investment profiles).
32 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT
FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 121 (Mar. 2008),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5M4N-XRSZ] [hereinafter TREASURY BLUEPRINT].
33 See Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers — What’s in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 31–32 (2005) (explaining the asset-based fee structure which best
promotes “customers’ and the brokers’ interests”); see also Certain Broker-Dealers
Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424, 20,428 (Apr. 19, 2005) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
34 The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 defines an investment adviser as “any person
who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others . . . as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities.”
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012).
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clients.35 The Supreme Court has described their role as “furnishing to clients
on a personal basis competent, unbiased, and continuous advice regarding the
sound management of their investments.”36 Investment advisers are regulated
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) and are
subject to direct SEC oversight.37 The Advisers Act imposes disclosure and
recordkeeping requirements, governs advertising by investment advisers, and
restricts the payment of referral fees, among other items.38 Importantly,
investment advisers are fiduciaries of their clients, which requires them to act
in their clients’ best interests at all times and to avoid conflicts with the
clients’ interests.39 Lastly, in making recommendations, it is not enough for an
investment adviser to determine whether the investment is suitable for her
client.40 Rather, she is required to consider her client’s financial resources,
investment objectives, risk appetite, and investment experience in giving
investment advice.41

C. Blurred Lines
The sharp legal delineation between brokers and investment advisers
notwithstanding, developments in the financial markets and financial services
have resulted in a considerable blurring of the line between brokers and
advisers. For example, the advent of electronic trading markets has automated
trade execution, thereby reducing brokers’ trading responsibilities.42 To

35 See id. § 206(3).
36 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 187

(1963) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 76-477, at 1 (1939)).
37 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3; see also 17 C.F.R. § 275.
38 See Wrona, supra note 14, at 14–16 (describing the different obligations and
restrictions imposed on investment advisers under the Advisers Act).
39 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977) (stating that
Congress intended section 206 of the Advisers Act, the antifraud provision, to establish
“federal fiduciary standards” for advisers); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tambone, 550 F.3d
106, 146 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Section 206 imposes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers to
act at all times in the best interest of the fund and its investors . . . .”), reh’g granted &
opinion withdrawn, 573 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Lay, 568 F. Supp. 2d 791,
812 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (an adviser must “act in good faith and in the best interests of its
client”).
40 See Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers
Should Be Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 725 (2012).
41 See Steven D. Irwin et al., Wasn’t My Broker Always Looking Out for My Best
Interests? The Road to Become a Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 41, 50 (2009) (“[A]
fiduciary duty sets a higher standard than the ‘suitability rule.’ The centerpiece of the
fiduciary duty is the requirement that investment advisers act in the best interest of their
clients.”)
42 See Michael Davis et al., Ethics, Finance, and Automation: A Preliminary Survey
of Problems in High Frequency Trading, 19 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 851, 854 (2013)
(explaining that even though intermediaries, such as brokers and investment advisers, still
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maintain their value within the market, brokers began focusing on providing
investment advice to clients.43 Brokers, therefore, increasingly resemble
investment advisers in their operations, but are able to avoid the more onerous
fiduciary obligation standard.44 The current state of affairs is concerning
primarily because of its impact on investor protection. Not only are retail
investors unable to distinguish between brokers and investment advisers, but
many retail investors expect that their financial advisor (regardless of title) is
required to act in their best interest (i.e., as a fiduciary).45
Against this backdrop, the U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) in
200846 and 200947 recommended harmonization of the standard of conduct
imposed on brokers and investment advisers to minimize investor confusion.
As Treasury noted in its 2009 Report, financial services professionals that
provide investment advice to retail investors, logically, ought to be held to the
same or highly similar standards to minimize regulatory arbitrage and investor
confusion.48 Nonetheless, the legal and regulatory gap between brokers and
investment advisers persisted, until the DOL proposed the Fiduciary Rule in
2016. 49 The Fiduciary Rule attempted to erase the blurred lines between
brokers and investment advisers, treating all financial services professionals
who provided investment advice as fiduciaries under ERISA. 50 Importantly,
the proposed Fiduciary Rule marked the beginning of serious regulatory
efforts to harmonize the legal framework applicable to brokers and investment
advisers.

III. EFFORTS TO “FIDUCIARIZE” INVESTMENT ADVICE
Prior to the DOL’s proposal of the Fiduciary Rule, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”)
participate in transactions involving automation, they do not automatically take
responsibility for the consequences from these transactions).
43 See generally Laby, supra note 40 (discussing the increase in brokers advertising
their advice services starting in the 1990s).
44 See id. at 744.
45 See id. at 733–34.
46 See TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 32, at 125–26.
47 Interpretive Rule Under the Advisers Act Affecting Broker-Dealers, 72 Fed. Reg.
55,126 (Sept. 28, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION
AND
REGULATION
71–72
(2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N2NB-AVW9] [hereinafter FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM].
48 See FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 47, at 71.
49 JOHN J. TOPOLESKI & GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44884,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S 2016 FIDUCIARY RULE: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 1 (July 2017).
50 See Definition of Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest—Retirement Investment
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510,
2550).

2019

THE CONFLICTED ADVICE PROBLEM

9

granted the SEC authority to harmonize the standard of care applicable to
brokers and investment advisers to the extent they provided personalized retail
investment advice.51 To the confusion of many, the SEC failed to exercise its
authority, choosing instead to allow the problematic gap in the legal treatment
of brokers and investment advisers to persist.52 However, once the DOL
proposed the Fiduciary Rule, it forced the SEC to consider how it would
intervene to similarly reduce conflicts of interests between financial advisors
and retail investors.53 As is to be expected, the response of financial advisors
to heightened standards of conduct varied according to their allegiances—
investment advisers strongly support leveling the playing field,54 while brokers
oppose the imposition of fiduciary obligation.55 Yet, the approach of the DOL
varies significantly from that of the SEC, with the former stridently
emphasizing a near-complete elimination of conflicts of interests through the
imposition of fiduciary obligations across the board;56 and the latter attempting
to straddle the line between brokers and investment advisers, without imposing
the fiduciary obligations of the latter on the former.57

A. The DOL and the Fiduciary Rule
The first meaningful effort to harmonize the legal framework applicable to
brokers and investment advisers came from the DOL through its authority
under ERISA. ERISA is a federal statute aimed at protecting employees that

51 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-

203

§ 913(f)–(g), 124 Stat. 1376, 1827–29 (2010).
52 See Interview by Inv. Adviser Ass’n with Arthur Levitt, former Chairman, Sec. &

Exch. Comm’n, in Investment Advisers Act 75th Anniversary – Statements from Industry
Leaders and Experts, INST. FOR THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD (Sept. 8, 2015),
http://www.thefiduciaryinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/Arthur_Levitt_and_David_Tittsworth_on_IAA_at_75.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q6NC-QQGA].
53 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,580 (May 9, 2018) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
54 See Michael Joyce, The SEC’s Best Interest Rule Doesn’t Go Far Enough, WEALTH
MGMT. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.wealthmanagement.com/regulation-compliance/secs-best-interest-rule-doesn-t-go-far-enough [https://perma.cc/TXQ2-BGK9] (stating that
“many registered investment advisors supported the implementation of the stricter
Department of Labor fiduciary rule”).
55 See Tamar Frankel, The Brokers’ War Against Fiduciary Duties, VERDICT (Mar.
14,
2018),
https://verdict.justia.com/2018/03/14/brokers-war-fiduciary-duties
[https://perma.cc/5ACB-2WPY] (“[B]rokers are fighting hard to avoid bearing fiduciary
duties to their clients.”).
56 See, e.g., Definition of Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest—Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).
57 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,575.
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participate in private retirement plans.58 The DOL is responsible for
administering the statute, including promulgating regulations in accordance
with the statute.59 Importantly, ERISA contains a provision that deems
someone a fiduciary to a retirement plan if she “renders investment advice for
a fee or other compensation . . . with respect to any moneys or other property
of such plan.”60 In response to the (potential) ambiguity of whether incidental
advice that brokers provide may transform them into fiduciaries, the DOL
adopted regulations to identify when it deemed a financial advisor a
fiduciary.61 Prior to adoption of the Fiduciary Rule, the DOL defined a
financial advisor as a fiduciary if and to the extent she provided personalized
investment advice on a regular basis based on a mutual agreement.62 This
definition limited the designation of fiduciary to include investment advisers,
who are already fiduciaries under the Advisers Act; and, importantly, to
exclude brokers who only provide advice in relation to their sales.63 Thus,
while investment advisers were deemed fiduciaries under ERISA, brokers
were subject to the suitability standard when dealing with retirement
investors.64
Under ERISA, fiduciaries are subjected to significant constraints that,
importantly, are designed to ensure the “undivided loyalty” of the fiduciary.65
Indeed, the range of conflicting interest transactions ERISA prohibits is more

58 See Judson MacLaury, A Brief History: The U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. DEP’T

LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/dolhistoxford.htm
[https://perma.cc/349F-QMHP] (“[ERISA] gave the Department a major role in protecting
and improving the nation’s private retirement systems.”).
59 See
Health
Plans
&
Benefits,
U.S.
DEP’T
LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans [https://perma.cc/YYU8-BJZL].
60 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(21)(A) (2012).
There are other activities that may make someone a fiduciary to a retirement plan, but this
is the only one of significance for purposes of the Response.
61 See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20,946 (final regulation defining “who is a fiduciary of
an employee benefit plan under [ERISA]”).
62 According to DOL regulation, a financial advisor is a fiduciary if she: (1) advises as
to “the value of securities or other property, or make[s] recommendations as to the
advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property (2) on a
regular basis (3) pursuant to a mutual agreement, arrangement, or understanding” between
the advisor and an employee benefit plan, (4) that such services “will serve as a primary
basis for investment decisions with respect to” the plan’s assets, and (5) that “the advice
will be individualized based on the particular needs of the plan or IRA.” Definition of the
Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg.
at 20,954–55.
63 See id.; Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2012).
64 See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20,946.
65 See Krug, supra note 23, at 356.
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extensive than securities laws and regulations.66 Nonetheless, because the
original ERISA fiduciary definition only encompassed financial advisors who
were already designated fiduciaries under securities laws (i.e., investment
advisers) and because investment advisers receive asset-based compensation
(as opposed to commission-based compensation), ERISA’s stringent fiduciary
limitations did not significantly affect the ability of investment advisers to
service retirement accounts.67
This all changed in 2016 when the DOL adopted the Fiduciary Rule. The
Fiduciary Rule expanded the scope of investment advice that would cause a
financial advisor to be deemed a fiduciary under ERISA.68 Per the new
definition, an advisor is a fiduciary if she provides “investment advice to a
retirement investor if, among other things, in exchange for a fee or other
compensation, she recommends particular securities, investment strategies, or
portfolio allocations to the investor.”69 In eschewing an agreement or that the
advice be provided regularly, the Fiduciary Rule effectively brought brokers
into the fold as ERISA fiduciaries if they provided any advice to retirement
investors. And importantly, under the Fiduciary Rule, as advisors of retirement
accounts, brokers would be required to provide conflict-free advice and to put
their clients’ needs above their self-interest.70
The Fiduciary Rule represented a significant shift in how brokers would be
allowed to interact with retirement investors. As newly-designated ERISA
fiduciaries, brokers would be subject to the same constraints as investment
advisers.71 Most notably, these restrictions included a prohibition on
transaction-based compensation (such as commissions), unless the retirement
advisor qualified for an exemption.72 Under one such exemption—the best
interest contract exemption—retirement advisors could continue to receive
commission-based compensation, but any difference in the amount of
commission paid to the retirement advisor had to be based on neutral factors.73
Thus, any commission received must be the same for similar product types,
66 See id. at 353 (describing prohibited transactions under ERISA that are allowed

under securities laws).
67 Id. at 341 (“By imposing on these advisers a stringent standard of conduct and
prohibiting them from entering into certain types of transactions, the statute establishes the
general framework for fiduciaries’ obligations to retirement investors.”).
68 See Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 20,997 (setting forth the DOL’s revised interpretation
of “investment advice”).
69 Krug, supra note 23, at 360.
70 See Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21,002, 21,007 (Apr. 8, 2016)
(establishing that Advisers must adhere to the standards of fiduciary conduct and “put the
interests of Retirement Investors first”).
71 See Krug, supra note 23, at 359.
72 See Best Interest Contract Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. at 21,002.
73 See id. at 21,007 (explaining that the Best Interest Contract Exemption allows
advisers to receive commission only if they adhere to procedures implemented to “prevent
violations of the Impartial Conduct Standard”).
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unless there was an objective, neutral basis for the difference, such as the time
or analytical effort required to advise the retirement investor.74 The Fiduciary
Rule, therefore, effectively eliminated many commission structures that
allowed brokers to sell securities that were suitable, but possibly not in the best
interest of the investor because of the brokers’ commission.
The Fiduciary Rule was met with staunch opposition from its inception. It
was finalized in April 2016 and, after numerous delays, full implementation
was slated for July 1, 2019.75 However, before the Fiduciary Rule could come
to be, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated it.76 The challenge to the
Fiduciary Rule came from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), and others that
contested the legal basis on which the executive branch adopted the Rule.77 In
March 2018, the Fifth Circuit held that the DOL’s definition of financial
advice was unreasonably broad and exceeded the scope of the Department’s
authority.78 The DOL failed to appeal the Fifth Circuit’s ruling to the Supreme
Court and, consequently, the controversial Fiduciary Rule is dead.79
Despite its ultimate demise, the Fiduciary Rule was an important step in
the path towards harmonization and fiduciarization of investment advice.
Many brokerage firms reported that, despite the repeal of the Fiduciary Rule,
they intend to maintain the changes they made to compensation and fee

74 See id. at 21,011 (“[T]he ongoing receipt of a Level Fee such as fixed percentage of
the value of a customer’s assets under management, where such values are determined by
readily available independent sources or independent valuations . . . .”).
75 See News Release: U.S. Department of Labor Extends Transition Period for
Fiduciary
Rule
Exemptions,
U.S.
DEP’T
LABOR
(Nov.
27,
2017),
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20171127-0
[https://perma.cc/QR75CMER].
76 See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 363 (5th
Cir. 2018).
77 See U.S. Chamber Examines Potential Harmful Impact of Fiduciary Regulation on
Investors, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.uschamber.com/pressrelease/us-chamber-examines-potential-harmful-impact-fiduciary-regulation-investors
[https://perma.cc/YAV3-ZZH5] (discussing the proposal of the Department of Labor to
impose fiduciary duties on brokers); Best Interest Standard, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS.
ASS’N,
https://www.sifma.org/explore-issues/best-interest-standard/
[https://perma.cc/R78W-ZFJ8]
(“Together
with
the
U.S.
Chamber
of
Commerce . . . SIFMA filed a legal challenge to the Department of Labor’s fiduciary
standard of conduct rule for brokers and registered investment advisors . . . .”).
78 See Chamber of Commerce, 885 F.3d at 387–88 (“DOL found ‘in a long-extant
statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of the American economy.’
And, although lacking direct regulatory authority over IRA ‘fiduciaries,’ DOL
impermissibly bootstrapped what should have been safe harbor criteria into ‘backdoor
regulation.’”).
79 See Ross Snel, R.I.P., DOL Fiduciary Rule, BARRON’S (June 21, 2018),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/r-i-p-dol-fiduciary-rule-1529605320
[https://perma.cc/75QD-HLZX].
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structures in anticipation of the Rule’s implementation.80 The Fiduciary Rule
is a bell that cannot be unrung, as financial advisors are unlikely to revert to
their pre-Fiduciary Rule business and compensation models.81 Further, the
uproar over the Fiduciary Rule has resulted in greater investor awareness of
the potential conflicts that may exist in their advisor relationships.82 Retail
investors are now more likely to have greater expectations of their financial
advisors.83 Importantly, the increased public discourse on the Fiduciary Rule
has heightened its regulatory importance. And as a result, the SEC in 2018
finally decided to exercise the authority granted to it under the Dodd-Frank
Act to heighten the standard of conduct applicable to brokers.

B. The SEC & Regulation Best Interest
Under Section 913(f) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC is authorized to
undertake rulemaking to address the “regulatory standards of care for brokers,
dealers, investment advisers [and their associates] for providing personalized
investment advice . . . to such retail customers.”84 The SEC is also authorized
under section 913(g) to adopt a uniform fiduciary standard applicable to both
brokers and investment advisers.85 In April 2018, the SEC put forward
Regulation Best Interest (the “Regulation”), which is a package of proposed
rulemakings and regulatory interpretations regarding the relationship between
brokers and investment advisers, on the one hand, and retail investors on the
other.86 Notably, in proposing the Regulation, the SEC exercised its
rulemaking authority under section 913(f) to impose standards of conduct on
80 See Charles Goldman, Eulogy for the DOL Fiduciary Rule, BARRON’S (Aug. 22,
2018),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/eulogy-for-the-dol-fiduciary-rule-1534955248
[https://perma.cc/BA63-NNKA] (explaining that “[m]any broker-dealers, probably most,
changed processes and procedures for the better”).
81 See David Trainer, Even Without the Rule, Fiduciary Awareness Remains, FORBES
(Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2018/03/16/even-withoutthe-law-fiduciary-rule-awareness-remains/#f2174a5425af [https://perma.cc/EP3H-T4HP].
82 See Jeff Benjamin, DOL Rule or Not, Be Prepared to Defend Investments, Fees
Under
a
Fiduciary
Standard,
INVESTMENTNEWS
(Feb.
1,
2017),
www.investmentnews.com/article/ 2 017020 1/FREE/170209983/dol-rule-or-not-beprepared-to-defend-investments-fees-under-a [https://perma.cc/87JH-QV8R] (quoting Joe
Taiber, managing partner of an investment consulting firm, who observed that “[r]egardless
of what happens, the cat’s out of the bag now, because clients are more educated” and that
“[w]hether the full rule is implemented or delayed, it doesn’t matter to the end user”).
83 See id.
84 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203
§ 913(f), 124 Stat. 1376, 1827–29 (2010). Dodd-Frank also authorized the SEC to
adopt a uniform fiduciary standard applicable to both brokers and investment advisers. In
adopting Regulation Best Interest, however, the SEC did not exercise its authority under
this provision. See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,675 (May 9, 2018) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
85 See Dodd-Frank Act § 913(g).
86 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,574.
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brokers, rather than uniform fiduciary obligations for brokers and investment
advisers per section 913(g).87
The proposed Regulation requires brokers to act in the “best interest” of
retail investors and prohibits brokers from placing their own financial interests
ahead of their clients’ interests.88 Notably, the Regulation does not go as far as
the Fiduciary Rule with respect to banning commission-based compensation.89
Recognizing that commissions constitute the most prevalent form of broker
compensation, the SEC determined that prohibiting commissions would be
more harmful than beneficial for retail investors.90 However, the Commission
also noted that the commission-based model is innately conflicted, and the
current suitability standard may not sufficiently protect retail investors.91
Thus, the Regulation aims to strike a balance between maintaining
commissions as a viable compensation model for brokers while improving
retail investor protection.
To address the embedded conflicts that accompany commission-based
compensation plans and enhance retail investor protection, the Regulation
imposes additional requirements on brokers in their interactions with retail
clients.92 Although the Regulation fails to define “best interest,” it states that
the determination as to whether a broker acted in the best interest of her client
will be made based on the facts and circumstances at the time the investment
advice is provided.93 In place of a definition, the Regulation provides a three-

87 See id. at 21,575 (“[W]e are proposing a new rule . . . [t]hat all broker-

dealers . . . act in the best interest of the retail customer at the time the recommendation is
made without placing the financial or other interest of the broker-dealer . . . ahead of the
interest of the retail customer (‘Regulation Best Interest’).”) (emphasis added).
88 See id.
89 See Sarah O’Brien, Labor Department Won’t Enforce Investor Protection Rule
After Court Decision, CNBC (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/19/dolshelving-enforcement-of-fiduciary-rule-after-court-decision.html [https://perma.cc/9LDERHNT] (“[The fiduciary rule] requires advisors and brokers to put their clients’ interests
before their own when advising on retirement accounts such as 401(k) plans and individual
retirement accounts.”).
90 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,580–81 (“[B]roker-dealers that
would be considered to be a ‘fiduciary’ under the DOL Fiduciary Rule . . . would be
prohibited from receiving common forms of broker-dealer compensation (notably,
transaction-based compensation), which would effectively eliminate a broker-dealer’s
ability or willingness to provide investment advice with respect to investors’ retirement
assets.”).
91 See id. at 21,575 (“Like many principal-agent relationships, the relationship
between a broker-dealer and an investor has inherent conflicts of interest, which may
provide an incentive to a broker-dealer to seek to maximize its compensation at the
expense of the investor it is advising.”).
92 See id.
93 See id. at 21,587 (explaining that the regulation does not intend to define “best
interest” since the recommendation depends on the “facts and circumstances of the
particular recommendation and the particular retail customer”).
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part framework that serves as a guide for brokers to know if they have acted in
their client’s best interest.94
To qualify for the Regulation’s safe harbor, first, a broker must provide
written disclosure of the material terms of the broker-client relationship,
including fees and any material conflicts of interests connected to the broker’s
investment advice.95 The broker is obligated to make these disclosures when
the investor opens the account, periodically as needed to update prior
disclosures, and at the time of sale if there are material conflicts related to the
security being sold.96
Second, the broker must exercise reasonable prudence and care to
determine whether the security is in the best interest of the customer.97 Thus,
the broker may no longer merely consider whether the investment is suitable
for the client; instead, she must determine if it is in the client’s best interest,
thereby raising the broker’s obligations.98 To comply with this requirement, a
broker is not required to evaluate all potential investments; but her
investigation must be sufficiently broad to constitute reasonable diligence.99
Further, the broker must also obtain client-specific information regarding the
investor’s risk appetite, investment goals, financial circumstances, and other
relevant information.100 Notably, the standard of care required cannot be
waived by the client, nor can the broker cure any failure to meet this obligation
through disclosure.101

94 See id. at 21,681.
95 See id. at 21,681 (“[The broker-dealer must], prior to or at the time of such

recommendation, reasonably disclose in writing all material conflicts of interest associated
with the recommendation.”).
96 See 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,605 (establishing that disclosure “may be achieved through a
variety of approaches: (1) at the beginning of a relationship . . . ; (2) on a regular or
periodic basis . . . ; (3) at other points . . . ; and/or (4) at multiple points in the relationship
or through a layered approach to disclosure”).
97 See id. at 21,589 (“[T]he BIC Exemption’s best interest standard incorporates
‘objective standards of care and undivided loyalty’ that would require adherence to a
professional standard of care in making investment recommendations that are in the
investor’s best interest . . . .”).
98 This obligation closely tracks FINRA’s existing suitability standard found in
FINRA Rule 2111. See Hillel T. Cohn et al., SEC Proposes a New Standard of Care for
Broker-Dealers: Regulation Best Interest, MORRISON FOERSTER (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/180424-sec-regulation-best-interest.html
[https://perma.cc/33M7-SEX5].
99 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,609 (“Under the Care
Obligation . . . [it] would not require a broker-dealer to analyze all possible securities, all
other products, or all investment strategies to recommend the single ‘best’ security or
investment strategy for the retail customer . . . .”).
100 See id. at 21,611 (listing elements that brokers have to consider regarding the
client’s characteristics and circumstances).
101 See id. at 21,595 (“[A] broker-dealer would not be able to waive compliance with
the rule’s obligation to act in the best interest of the retail customer at the time a
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Third, the Regulation requires brokers to implement policies and
procedures reasonably designed to identify conflicts of interest and to disclose
material conflicts to retail investors in a timely manner.102 The policies and
procedures must be capable of capturing new conflicts as they arise and must
address how brokers will mitigate against compensation-based conflicts.103 Per
the Regulation, disclosure will be insufficient with respect to certain conflicts
such as those arising from sales incentives. In these instances, brokers will be
required to eliminate the source of the conflict.104 Thus, despite choosing not
to prohibit commission-based compensation, the Regulation places the burden
on brokers to evaluate and, in some instances, minimize or eliminate conflicts
of interest.
The Regulation also requires brokers and investment advisers to provide
retail investors with a “client relationship summary,” Form CRS.105 The
summary would include information regarding: (i) the relationships, accounts,
and services the firm offers; (ii) the standard of conduct applicable to offered
services; (iii) the fees for and costs of services; (iv) comparisons between
brokers and investment advisers services, fees, and standard of conduct; (v)
conflicts of interests related to the broker’s services; (vi) access to additional
information, such as legal or disciplinary actions against the brokerage firm
and its brokers; and (vii) required questions a retail investor may want to
ask.106
With Regulation Best Interest, the SEC signaled its willingness to enter
the ongoing conversation regarding the standard of conduct applicable to
investment advisers and brokers. However, in formulating a new standard, it is
questionable whether the Commission has truly moved the ball forward. On
recommendation is made and the specific obligations thereunder, nor can a retail customer
agree to waive her protection under Regulation Best Interest.”).
102 See id. at 21,617 (explaining that the Conflict of Interest Obligations require a
broker-dealer to disclose to the client all material conflict of interest related to the
recommendation).
103 See id.
104 See Cohn et al., supra note 98 (“Disclosure alone will not suffice in the case of
conflicts that relate to financial incentives or the manner in which associated persons are
compensated.”); see also Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. at 21,619 (“A brokerdealer seeking to address its Conflict of Interest Obligations through elimination of a
material conflict of interest could choose to eliminate the conflict of interest entirely, for
example by removing incentives associated with a particular product . . . .”).
105 See Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, What’s in a Name?
Regulation Best Interest v. Fiduciary, Remarks at the National Association of Plan
Advisors D.C. Fly-In Forum (July 24, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speechpeirce-072418 [https://perma.cc/8XZ9-YG78] (“New Form CRS . . . is a four-page (at
most) document to be delivered in addition to—not in place of—any of the current
disclosure documents that broker-dealers and advisers currently provide.”).
106 See Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV; Required
Disclosures in Retail Communications and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Names or
Titles, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,416, 21,536 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 249, 275, 279).
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the one hand, the best interest standard and the accompanying disclosures are
enhancements over the current suitability standard. However, on the other
hand, by failing to harmonize the obligations of standard of conduct applicable
to investment advisers and brokers, the SEC may have missed an opportunity
to truly eliminate the confusion retail investors face in their dealings with
financial service professionals. In Part IV, this Response briefly explores the
implications of the failed Fiduciary Rule and the proposed Regulation Best
Interest for retail investors.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR RETAIL INVESTORS
As Professor Edwards details in his paper, conflicted advice is a
significant problem for retail investors and the wider economy. 107 Regulation
Best Interest and the Fiduciary Rule sought to address the conflicted advice
problem Professor Edwards discusses,108 albeit in different ways. However,
both proposals fall short in addressing the problem of conflicted advice and the
attendant consequences of such advice. Although the Fiduciary Rule has been
vacated and ultimately will not be part of the regulatory landscape, it is useful
to consider how it could have altered the relationship between retail investors
and financial advisors, particularly in comparison to Regulation Best Interest.
Part IV examines whether and to what extent the Fiduciary Rule and
Regulation Best Interest effectively (i) address the problem of conflicted
advice, (ii) reduce investor confusion, and (iii) increase investor protection.

A. Conflicted Advice
In light of the issues that stem from conflicted advice, it is important to
consider whether and to what extent both the Fiduciary Rule and Regulation
Best Interest address the issue of conflicted advice.
The approach of the Fiduciary Rule to the problem of conflicted
investment advice was, more or less, straightforward—retirement investment
advisors, as fiduciaries, were required to avoid all conflicts of interest.109 This
requirement would have implemented a near-complete ban on commissionbased compensation, unless an exception was available. The Fiduciary Rule,
therefore, would have established a bright-line stance towards conflicted
advice—it simply would not have been allowed.110 On the positive side, the
bright-line the Fiduciary Rule created would have left very little room for
conflicted advice to exist. Brokers would have been charged with putting the
interests of their clients first, which could not be accomplished with many
107 See Edwards, supra note 1, at 183.
108 See generally Peirce, supra note 105 (discussing the theoretical underpinnings of

each proposed regulation).
109 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
110 It is more accurate to say a somewhat bright-line rule, given the exceptions
possible. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
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commission-based compensation schemes.111 The hard stance of the Fiduciary
Rule, therefore, would eliminate the problem of conflicted advice entirely,
freeing retirement investors from the concerns that their brokers may be
steering them towards puzzling product choices, which may not be in the
investors’ best interests but would compensate the brokers handsomely.
Despite these benefits, to some commentators the elimination of commissionbased products would not have resulted in a net benefit to retail investors.112
Specifically, the Fiduciary Rule would have limited the investment products
available to retirement investors and, possibly, forced some retirement
investors with less assets out of the marketplace for retirement investment
advice.113
The SEC’s proposed approach to conflicted advice may be viewed as more
of a middle-ground. Regulation Best Interest does not ban conflicted
compensation schemes, such as commissions, but it requires brokers to take
more active steps in mitigating and, in some cases, eliminating conflicts of
interest.114 By requiring that brokers comply with the three-part framework to
be entitled to the presumption that they acted in the best interests of their
clients, Regulation Best Interest imposes a standard of conduct that exceeds
the existing suitability standard.115 The Regulation permits transaction-based
compensation plans, which are innately conflicted, but imposes a regime in
which conflicts are disclosed and managed.116 The proposed framework,
therefore, seeks to balance the interest of brokers to maintain commissions as a
viable compensation method against the need to protect investors from the ills
of conflicted advice. The question then becomes whether the proposed
framework minimizes the effects of conflicted advice.
In avoiding a prescriptive, bright-line standard, akin to the Fiduciary Rule,
the SEC grants brokers some flexibility in designing compliance standards and
111 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,620 (May 9, 2018) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (“[B]roker-dealer financial incentives—including internal
compensation structures and compensation arrangements with third parties—create
inherent conflicts that . . . may be difficult, if not impossible, to effectively manage through
disclosure alone, or to eliminate.”).
112 See Paul R. Walsh & David W. Johns, Can the Retail Investor Survive the
Fiduciary Standard?, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 437, 446–47 (2013) (explaining that if the
commission-based products are eliminated, brokers would have to be compensated through
a percentage fee. Therefore, brokers would require investors to have a minimum amount of
assets and this would harm small investors who would not be able to afford a broker of
investment advisor).
113 See Chamber of Commerce of United States v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 885
F.3d 360, 368 (5th Cir. 2018).
114 See Cohn et al., supra note 98 (“Rather than prohibit all such conflicts, however,
the SEC is proposing more rigorous requirements to manage and disclose conflicts of
interest, including conflicts that arise from the manner in which a broker-dealer is
compensated.”).
115 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
116 See supra Part III.B.
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procedures that are suitable for their business and clients. The Regulation
allows brokers to continue acting as principals for their own accounts in their
dealings with retail investors but prohibits brokers from placing their interests
before their clients’.117 Thus, brokers may continue to receive commissionbased compensation, provided that it is nonetheless in their clients’ best
interests. Yet, it is questionable whether this fluid standard meaningfully
mitigates against the conflicted advice problem. Setting aside the lack of
definition of “best interest” (addressed in greater detail below), the Regulation
falls short of establishing a fiduciary standard, which leaves retail investors
exposed to significant conflicts of interest. The Regulation’s proposed threepart framework establishes a way for brokers to earn a safe harbor but,
arguably, does not do enough to protect retail investors from receiving
conflicted advice. By providing brokers with a “check-the-box” mechanism to
comply with their obligations to act in the client’s “best interest,” the
Regulation fails to impose enough of a burden on brokers to reduce their
conflicts of interest.
Furthermore, in dealing with clients, brokers are not required to provide
full and fair disclosure of all material conflicts; rather, they are obliged to
provide reasonable disclosures.118 The standard of reasonableness, while
appropriate for some situations, may not be the best standard when trying to
mitigate against conflicts of interest.119 Regulation Best Interest, therefore,
may have moved the needle somewhat on the issue of conflicted advice, but it
may not be enough to provide meaningful investor protection. Indeed, it is
questionable whether a disclosure-based regulatory framework will effectively
address the problem of conflicted advice.120 This is true particularly in the face
of the unequal power dynamic between brokers and their clients and the
unavoidable conflicts of interest that accompany transaction-based
compensation.121

117 See Cohn et al., supra note 98 (“Under the proposed regulation, broker-dealers and
their associated persons would be required to act in the ‘best interest’ of their retail clients
and would be prohibited from placing their interests ahead of such clients. Broker-dealers
could continue to act in a principal capacity in relation to their customers . . . .”).
118 See Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Proposals
Relating to Regulation Best Interest, Form CRS, Restrictions on the Use of Certain Names
or Titles, and Commission Interpretation Regarding the Standard of Conduct for
Investment Advisers (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/steinstatement-open-meeting-041818 [https://perma.cc/Z7F6-ZEG2].
119 See id. (discussing the “safe harbor” implied by the best interest obligation, and
stating that the SEC could have proposed a more effective standard to mitigate conflict of
interest in the broker-dealer and client relationship).
120 See supra Part III.C.
121 See Cohn et al., supra note 98 (describing how conflicts are inherent in the brokerdealer business model).

20

FURTHERMORE

Spring 2019

B. Investor Confusion
Another implication of the Fiduciary Rule and Regulation Best Interest is
their effect on minimizing investor confusion. To the extent investors are less
confused about from whom they receive advice, it is possible investors may be
better able to guard themselves against the negative impact of conflicted
advice. That is to say, if an investor knows that the advice she receives is
conflicted or potentially conflicted, she may be warier of accepting or
following the advice.
The Fiduciary Rule would have harmonized the standard of conduct
applicable to brokers and investment advisers—all retirement investment
advisors, regardless of classification, would have been fiduciaries of their
clients.122 However, owing to the DOL’s limited authority, the Rule’s
harmony would have only extended to retirement investment accounts.123
Thus, on the one hand, the Fiduciary Rule would have reduced the potential
for investor confusion by imposing a uniform fiduciary standard on retirement
investment advisors. But, on the other hand, the Fiduciary Rule would have
exacerbated potential investor confusion, because the applicable standards of
conduct would vary based on whether the investor received advice from a
broker versus an investment adviser and whether the advice was regarding a
retirement or non-retirement account. The Fiduciary Rule, therefore, would
have created both more clarity and more confusion regarding the level of
protection to which retirement investors would be entitled. An investor would
receive the same level of protection for retirement-related advice, without
regard for whether the advice came from a broker or an investment adviser.
However, for non-retirement advice, she would remain subject to the
confusing legal delineation between brokers and investment advisers.
Yet, it is important to note that most investors are likely to seek
investment advice, for both retirement and non-retirement accounts, from a
single financial advisor. Thus, in order to comply with the Fiduciary Rule,
most financial advisors would be forced to raise their standards all-around
regardless of the type of account a retail client may have. Meaning, rather than
try to comply with conflicting standards, brokers likely would have selfimposed the Fiduciary Rule’s higher standards even when advising nonretirement accounts. In sum, despite being a half-measure, the Fiduciary Rule
took a meaningful step towards minimizing the existing conflicts of interest
within the DOL’s sphere of authority (i.e., the retirement investor-financial
advisor relationship), which likely would have permeated investor advice
beyond the scope of ERISA.
In proposing the Regulation, the SEC asserts that it seeks to minimize the
gap that exists in how much protection investors believe they have when
122 See Krug, supra note 23, at 359 (explaining that the Fiduciary Rule treats brokers
like other ERISA fiduciaries).
123 See supra Part III.A.
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receiving advice and how much protection they actually have.124 However, in
addressing the disparity, the SEC eschews the well-known fiduciary standard
for the unknown, newly created “best interest” standard.125 The Regulation
and its new standard create or exacerbate three sources of potential investor
confusion.
First, the Regulation fails to harmonize the standard of conduct applicable
to investment advisers and brokers who provide investment advice.126 Despite
acting in a substantially similar role as investment advisers, Regulation Best
Interest does not impose on brokers who give investment advice the same
fiduciary obligations as investment advisers.127 This only serves to exacerbate
the existing confusion regarding the level of protection that is available to
retail investors in the marketplace.
Second, “best interest” is undefined in the Regulation.128 With the best
interest standard, retail investors are not much better off in understanding what
duties a broker may owe them and, likely, the broker’s obligations are still less
in reality than investors expect, since the broker is not a fiduciary.129
Third, the name of the standard suggests that brokers are free from
conflicts. To a layperson, saying that someone must act in your best interest
implies that (i) the person is your agent (to use a legal phrase) and that (ii)
your interests must supersede hers. But neither of these things is true under
Regulation Best Interest.130 Thus, the very name of the standard deepens
investor confusion, by misleading retail investors as to the legal obligations of
their brokers in providing investment advice.
In sum, despite claiming to want to minimize investor confusion, it is
questionable whether Regulation Best Interest actually does this. In creating a
new standard of conduct, the SEC has exacerbated the problem of investor
confusion without truly closing the gap between investor expectation and the
reality of investor protection. And, indeed, because of its misleading name,
Regulation Best Interest may have worsened investor confusion.

124 See SEC Proposes to Enhance Protections and Preserve Choice for Retail Investors
in Their Relationships with Investment Professionals, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr.
18, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-68 [https://perma.cc/DHQ6N5Y9] (explaining that the Regulation Best Interest intends to “make it clear that a brokerdealer may not put its financial interests ahead of the interests of a retail customer” and to
avoid investors’ confusion regarding “their relationships with investment professionals”).
125 See supra Part III.B.
126 See Peirce, supra note 105 (comparing Regulation Best Interest to the fiduciary
duty of investment advisers).
127 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
128 See Stein, supra note 118 (“Despite repeated requests to define what best interest
means in the rule text, it was decided that there was no need to define it.”).
129 See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
130 See supra Part III.B.
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C. Investor Protection
Both the Fiduciary Rule and Regulation Best Interest directly implicate
investor protection. The pertinent question one must ask is whether the
proposed changes provide investors with greater protection either (i) against
conflicted advice, or (ii) against the possible negative consequences of selfinterested investment advice.
The Fiduciary Rule transformed all retirement investment advisors into
fiduciaries of their clients.131 Under the Fiduciary Rule, brokers would owe
their retirement clients their undivided loyalty, which meant commissionbased compensation was prohibited.132 Undoubtedly, the Fiduciary Rule
would have increased the protection available to retirement investors by
imposing fiduciary obligations on brokers, thereby ensuring a basic level of
protection for all retirement investors regardless of whether they receive
investment advice from a broker versus an investment adviser. However, as
stated prior, this greater level of protection would have been limited to brokers
who provided retirement investment advice,133 thus limiting the effectiveness
of the Fiduciary Rule. Thus, the Fiduciary Rule would have provided investors
with protection against both conflicted advice and the costs of self-interested
advice; however, owing to the limited scope of ERISA this protection would
not have been market-wide.
A primary goal of Regulation Best Interest is to raise the standard of
conduct applicable to brokers;134 and the best interest standard does, indeed,
impose a standard of conduct higher than the current suitability rule.135
Brokers are no longer allowed to steer clients towards a high-commission
product when a substantially similar product that pays a lower commission is
also available.136 Thus, a broker’s self-interest cannot be the predominant
motivating factor in her advice to retail investors.137 Further, in requiring
brokers to mitigate or eliminate particularly egregious conflicts of interest,138
Regulation Best Interest reduces the potential for conflicted advice. It places
an affirmative duty on brokers to assess existing conflicts and to take steps
necessary to minimize the impact of these conflicts on their client
131 See O’Brien, supra note 89.
132 See Cohn et al., supra note 98 (“Broker-dealers making any kind of investment

recommendation to retail retirement investors would be deemed fiduciaries and would be
prohibited from acting in a principal capacity or from receiving commissions . . . .”).
133 See supra Part III.A.
134 See Cohn et al., supra note 98 (“The proposed Regulation Best Interest would
establish a higher standard of care and disclosure for broker-dealers when making
recommendations to retail customers . . . .”).
135 See id.
136 See id. (“The Regulation states that a broker-dealer and its associated persons may
not place their own interests ahead of the interests of a retail customer.”).
137 See Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,574, 21,585–87 (May 9, 2018) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
138 See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text.
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relationships.139 Lastly, Form CRS provides investors with more information
about who they are transacting with (i.e., whether their financial services
professional is a broker or an investment adviser), the applicable fees for the
services they are receiving, and past disciplinary information on the broker
and/or her associated firm.140 More information for retail investors about the
persons to whom they have entrusted their investment is certainly a welcomed
change and may empower investors to be more critical of their brokers’
investment advice.
However, despite these positive attributes, there are legitimate concerns as
to whether Regulation Best Interest is a meaningful improvement on the status
quo. First, it is questionable whether and to what extent the best interest
standard is more protective of investors than the suitability standard. The best
interest standard does not rise to the level of fiduciary duties, but it is supposed
to be more than the suitability standard. Yet, the best interest standard is
modeled so closely on the suitability standard, with the wording of the former
tracking the wording of the latter to a significant degree.141 Thus, it is unclear
just how the best interest standard differs from the suitability standard.142 As
the proposed Regulation is revised and eventually adopted, it remains to be
seen what additional measure of protection the best interest standard provides
that supersedes the existing standard.
Second, Regulation Best Interest relies heavily on disclosure to protect
retail investors. Disclosure is only as good as it is effective and many,
including some SEC Commissioners, have raised concerns about whether the
disclosure-heavy standard of conduct will have any meaningful effect on retail
investors.143 As studies have shown, investors are not likely to read and/or
understand disclosures that are given to them.144 Given the importance of
disclosure in the implementation of the best interest standard, the SEC ought
139 See id.
140 See Peirce, supra note 105.
141 See supra note 98, and accompanying text.
142 See Stein, supra note 118 (“[T]his proposal allows a broker-dealer to meet its ‘best

interest’ obligation by doing three things: providing some ‘reasonable’ disclosure about its
relationship with the customer, fulfilling what are essentially the existing standards for
broker-dealer conduct (i.e., suitability) . . . .”); see also Ann Marsh, Fiduciary Fatigue
Settles Over SEC Best Interest Rule Debate, FIN. PLAN. (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://www.financial-planning.com/news/sec-best-interest-rule-hampered-by-fiduciaryfatigue [https://perma.cc/5UND-2MFP] (criticizing the new Regulation Best Interest,
claiming that it is no different from the suitability standard) (quoting Professor James Cox).
143 See Peirce, supra note 105 (discussing the proposed Regulation Best Interest and
questioning whether the imposition of a higher standard of conduct would result “in retail
customers losing access to advice”).
144 Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of Disclosure,
2011 WIS. L. REV. 1059, 1070–71 (2011) (“[L]ay investors typically do not read disclosure
documents when investing in securities, meaning that investors who receive a document
indicating that their stock broker owes them no fiduciary duty often (a) will not even read
it . . . or (b) if they do read it, they will not go to the trouble of figuring out what the heck it
means . . . .”).
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to ensure that the disclosures are as effective as possible in conveying the
necessary information to investors. But, even the most effective disclosures
may not be enough to protect investors without a more robust investor
protection regime. Thus, reasonable minds may differ on whether the proposed
framework of Regulation Best Interest enhances investor protection in any
meaningful way.

V. CONCLUSION
The conflicted advice problem that faces retail investors seeking advice
from brokers is persistent; it poses significant challenges for investors and
regulators alike. Conflicted investment advice cost investors millions of
dollars and has resulted in significant capital diversions within the larger
economy. Recent efforts to solve this problem, however, have been plagued
with shortcomings. The Fiduciary Rule was a bright line rule that threatened
the viability of commission-based compensation for retail investment advice.
It removed conflicts almost entirely from the broker-investor relationship. But
in doing so, it arguably would have curtailed investor choice and possibly
would have increased investor costs. With Regulation Best Interest, the SEC
aimed to strike a middle ground. However, its attempts demonstrate the
difficulties in balancing investor protection against industry interests. As a
proposal, Regulation Best Interest is a step in the right direction, but it is
insufficient. In spite of the Regulation, retail investors will nonetheless face
significant conflicts of interest, confusion about the protections they are
afforded in the market, and less actual protection than the fiduciary standard.
To effectively address the conflicted advice problem, therefore, the SEC must
decide which it values more: protecting investors protection or maintaining the
viability of commission-based compensation. It is only in truly deciding
between these two competing interests that Regulation Best Interest (or any
future attempts to heighten the brokers’ standard of conduct) will be able to
clarify the relationship between retail investors and their financial advisors.

